

Solving the problems of ipsative data: The common framework for proper scaling of comparative response formats

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
Absolute and comparative judgements


- Rephrasing Coombs (1960), the essential objective of psychological assessments is to associate with each person a point in a psychological space
 - Obtain person's absolute position on attributes of interest (personality traits, abilities, etc.)
 - O By collecting responses of persons to relevant stimuli
 - "…basically, all a person can do is to compare stimuli with each other, or against some absolute standard or personal reference point…"
 - 0 i.e. using either absolute or comparative judgements


Single stimulus


	Not at all	Somewhat	Quite like	Completely	
	like me	like me	me	like me	
A. Dependable				Х	
B. Curious			Х		

- Person is asked where he/she stands in relation to each stimulus (absolute judgements)
- + Easy to infer absolute positions on relevant attributes
- Open to response biases
 - Vulnerable to idiosyncratic uses of the rating options (response styles)
 - Easy to endorse all stimuli (acquiescence, leniency, "halo")
 - Easy to endorse all desirable stimuli (socially desirable responding)











Comparative judgements



Stimuli are compared with each other (comparative judgement)

Prevents uniform response biases

- Impossible to endorse all stimuli
- O Can reduce socially desirable responding*
- Facilitates differentiation beyond absolute judgements

Classical scaling method

	Rank
A. Dependable	3
B. Curious	1
C. Modest	2
D. Calm	4


O Logic is the same in all comparative formats

In ranking tasks, assign points to attributes according to stimuli's inverse ranks

Problems of ipsative data

O The total test score is the same for everyone

- 1. Attribute scores are relative to the person's mean
 - Interpersonally incomparable
- 2. Construct validity is distorted
 - Lose one degree of freedom
 - Factor analysis is not possible
 - Negative average scale inter-correlation
- **3.** Criterion-related validity is distorted
 - Correlations with an external criterion sum to zero
- Assumption of consistent coding violated
 Alpha is not appropriate measure of reliability



New scaling of comparative data

- The classical scaling approach fails to provide absolute positions on traits
- New models for comparative formats are required
 - Ø Models for choice behaviour in psychology have existed for a long time, and they are well known:
 - O Thurstone's law of comparative judgement (1927)
 - Coombs's (1950) unfolding preference model
 - Luce's (1959) choice axioms
 - O Tversky's (1972) "elimination by aspect" theory
 - And others

Law of comparative judgement

O Thurstone (1927)

- Each item elicits a utility psychological value, or "affect that the object calls forth"
- Item with the higher utility at the moment of comparison is preferred (utility maximization rule, or UMR)

In a preferential choice task, item 1 is preferred if

utilty₁ \geq utilty₂,

otherwise item 2 is preferred

In a ranking task, the utilities of items ranked 1, 2,..., n must be ordered so that

 $utilty_1 \ge utilty_2 \ge ... \ge utility_n$

Response model for choice

	More	More	
	like me	like me	
A. Dependable	Х		B. Curious

Person is asked which of two stimuli he/she prefers
Outcome of comparison {*i*, *k*} is a binary variable

 $\mathbf{y}_{\{i,k\}} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i \text{ is preferred} \\ 0, & \text{if } k \text{ is preferred} \end{cases}$

According to the UMR, the outcome is determined by the relative values of utilities (denoted t)

$$\mathbf{y}_{\{i,k\}} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } t_i \ge t_k \\ 0, & \text{if } t_i < t_k \end{cases}$$

Utilities and binary outcomes

O Consider the difference of utilities $y_{\{i,k\}}^* = t_i - t_k$

O Then the outcome of preferential choice {i, k} $y_{\{i,k\}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y^*_{\{i,k\}} \ge 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } y^*_{\{i,k\}} < 0 \end{cases}$

O Threshold process

- O Unobserved utility difference y* is the response tendency for observed binary outcome y
- Assuming utility differences normally distributed, this is an IRT model with the link function = normal ogive

Response model for ranking

	Rank
A. Dependable	3
B. Curious	1
C. Modest	2
D. Calm	4

- Person is asked to rank several stimuli in order of preference
- Ranking of *n* stimuli involves *n(n-1)/2* pairwise
 preferential choices (binary dummy variables)
- Partial ranking or ranking with ties
 - only top preference; only top and bottom preference; Q-sorts
 - o some pairwise outcomes are missing

Measurement model for utilities


- Preferential choices (*observed* variables) are determined by utility judgements (*latent* variables)
- Utility judgements depend on underlying psychological attributes that we want to measure
 - Measurement model is needed to link utilities to the attributes (latent factors)
 - Linear Factor Analysis models (LFA)
 - Ideal Point models (IP)
 - We use LFA models; for example, factorially pure utility

$$t_i = \mu_i + \lambda_{ia} \eta_a + \varepsilon_i$$

Thurstonian factor model for ranking blocks

- Second-order factor model with binary outcomes
 Model estimation using

 Tetrachoric correlations
 ULS or DWLS
- Responses are transitive; no pairwise errors



Graded preference

	Much	Slightly	Slightly	Much	
	more like	more like	more like	more like	
	me	me	me	me	
A. Dependable		Х			B. Curious


Person is asked to what extent he/she prefers one or the other stimulus, using graded categories

Outcome of comparison {*i*, *k*} is an ordinal variable

 $\mathbf{y}_{\{i,k\}} = \begin{cases} 4, & \text{if item } i \text{ is preferred "much more"} \\ 3, & \text{if item } i \text{ is preferred "slightly more"} \\ 2, & \text{if item } k \text{ is preferred "slightly more"} \\ 1, & \text{if item } k \text{ is preferred "much more"} \end{cases}$

Utilities and ordinal outcomes

• UMR applied to graded preference decisions




Ordinal outcomes are categorised response tendencies

- O Threshold process (C-1 ordered thresholds)
- IRT model with link function = normal ogive

Thurstonian factor model for graded blocks

- Second-order factor model with ordinal outcomes
- Model estimation using
 Polychoric correlations
 ULS or DWLS
- Responses may be intransitive; pairwise errors



Proportion-of-total preference ("composition")

	% like me	% like me	
A. Dependable	60	40	B. Curious


Person is asked to express preference for one or the other stimulus as proportion of total

- o Points given to the stimuli y_i and y_k are ratio variables
 - Ratio of points y_i/y_k is the obvious outcome variable
 - OPreserves the ratio of psychological values felt for the stimuli $C_{\nu} / \sum_{\nu}^{n} V$

$$\frac{y_i}{y_k} = \frac{C v_i / \sum_{q=1}^{n} v_q}{C v_k / \sum_{q=1}^{n} v_q} = \frac{v_i}{v_k}$$

Utilities and ratio outcomes

• Ratio of observed points is log-normal




Log-transformed ratios of points is the observed outcome (normal)

$$\mathbf{y}_{\{i,k\}} = \ln\left(\frac{\mathbf{y}_i}{\mathbf{y}_k}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{\mathbf{v}_i}{\mathbf{v}_k}\right) = \ln\left(\mathbf{v}_i\right) - \ln\left(\mathbf{v}_i\right) = t_i - t_k$$

The utility difference is actually observed Interval level of measurement, linear model

Thurstonian factor model for compositional blocks

- Compositional blocks of size=*n* are described by *n*-1 contrasts with a referent item
- Second-order factor model with continuous outcomes
- Model estimation using
 Pearson's correlations
 - Ø Maximum Likelihood



Estimating persons' positions on attributes

- Once model parameters are known, factor scores may be estimated
 - For binary and ordinal outcomes (IRT models), a combination of scores is found, for which the observed response pattern is most likely
 - Maximises the mode of the posterior likelihood (MAP)
 - In ranking blocks, pairwise error is 0 and factor scores cannot be estimated. Second-order factor model is parameterised as 1st-order model (TIRT model)
 - For continuous outcomes, regression with correlated factors is used

<u>Person scores on attributes are no longer ipsative!</u>

But how can relative information ever become absolute???

Positions of utilities are relative

 $(t_i + c) - (t_k + c) = t_i - t_k$

- Ø But we wanted absolute positions of attributes (secondorder factors), not utilities!
 - From unidimensional comparison, the scale of attribute can be identified, unless the factor loadings are equal

$$\overline{t_i} - \overline{t_k} = \mu_i - \mu_k + (\lambda_i - \lambda_k) \eta$$

 From multidimensional comparisons, the scales of attributes can be identified, unless the factor loadings are linear combinations of each other

$$\overline{t_i} - \overline{t_k} = \mu_i - \mu_k + \lambda_{ia} \eta_a - \lambda_{kb} \eta_b$$
$$\overline{t_q} - \overline{t_r} = \mu_q - \mu_r + \lambda_{qa} \eta_a - \lambda_{rb} \eta_b$$

The new rules of comparative measurement

- Recommendations for good comparative questionnaire designs are available
 - How to maximize information (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011)
 - How to ensure identification of attribute scales? (Brown, 2016)
 - What kind of items? (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2010)
- Other considerations
 - Ocognitive complexity increases as the block size increases
 - For good control of social desirability, careful matching of items within blocks is needed

Summary: Comparative data

	Level of measurement			
Block size	Binary	Ordinal	Ratio	
n = 2	Choice between 2 alternatives	Graded comparison between 2 alternatives	Composition with 2 alternatives	
n ≥ 3	Ranking (full or partial); Ranking with ties (Q- sort)	Graded block (paired graded comparisons)	Composition with 3 or more alternatives	

Summary: Analysis of comparative questionnaire data


- We adopt the outcome of pairwise comparison as the universal data unit
- We assume that utility maximisation is the basis for outcome of any comparison (binary, ordinal, ratio)
- We adopt utility difference as the universal latent variable underpinning the pairwise outcome
 - o The normal utility difference $y^*_{\{i,k\}}$ is the response tendency for $y_{\{i,k\}}$
 - In preferential choice, the latent tendency is dichotomised
 - In graded preference, it is categorised
 - In composition, it is directly observed

Applications

Redesign of OPQ32i

Most Least

- A I enjoy talking to new people
- B I rarely keep things tidy
- C I like to help others
- D I worry about deadlines



- OPQ32i was used in assessment for managerial and professional roles worldwide
- Ø Measured 32 work-related traits with 416 items arranged in 104 partial ranking quads
 - Yielded ipsative scores
- Thurstonian IRT model was applied to create OPQ32r (Brown & Bartram, 2009)
 - O Changed format from quads to triplets cognitive simplicity
 - Took out least informative items based on the item parameters

Development of a Big 5 measure (FCFFM)

- Using the TIRT model as the basis, Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011) developed a FC questionnaire from scratch
 - Used 60 IPIP items, the five factor markers subset by Goldberg (1992)
 - 12 items per factor; 8 positively and 4 negatively keyed
 - Triplets (n = 3); equal number of pairs with items keyed in the same direction and items keyed in opposite directions
- ITRT was fitted to a sample of N=438 (RMSEA=.025)
 - Very similar inter-scale correlations to the Likert model (but slightly less inflated intercorrelations)
 - Mono-trait hetero-method correlations were very similar to reliabilities
- Later modified to be used as Compositional (Brown, 2016), and Graded Blocks (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2017)

Re-analysis of old data that were not thought comparative

- Picture story exercise (PSE) consists of drawn pictures showing people
 - Respondents write stories describing what is happening in each of the pictures
 - PSE is supposed to measure implicit motives
 - Each story is scored based on how much each motive was mentioned
- PSE has been shown to have good external validity but very poor reliability ("reliability paradox")
- Lang (2014) considered stories as expressions of competing motives
 - Implicitly comparative data, only outcomes of comparisons (between competing motives) gets observed
 - "Dynamic Thurstonian model" utility maximisation, plus the principle of diminishing strength of motive after it gets expressed
 - Showed that the PSE was reliable all along, but used the wrong model (Cronbach's alpha inappropriate)

Growing area of research

For binary choice data, other models exist:

- E.g. Zinnes-Griggs (1974); Andrich (1989, 1995); MUPP (Stark, Chernyshenko & Drasgow, 2005)
- These models assume different measurement models for utilities and can be classified using a common framework (Brown, 2016a)
- For graded preferences and compositional data, I am not aware of any alternatives to the Thurstonian models

Future directions

Ocomputerized Adaptive Testing (CAT)

- Already works with MUPP ("TAPAS", Stephen Stark and colleagues)
- We are working on CAT with TIRT (my PhD student Yin Lin)
 - Lin & Brown (2017) looked into the influence of context (which block the item is in) on item parameters
- Latent classes rather than latent factors underlying preferences
 - For example, the use of FC formats for assessments of personality types
- O To what extent can the comparative formats prevent faking? A much more in-depth research is needed

Thank you

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